Article by Aparna Gupte (MIT), Seyoon Ragavan (Google Quantum AI & MIT), and Mark Zhandry (Google Quantum AI & Stanford University) From the articles abstract:“In this note, we formally show that the recent algorithm by Simon (ePrint:2026/1591, August 11 2026) does not extract the least-significant bit of the dihedral coset problem (DCP) secret with non-negligible… Read more »
That is explained by Ivan Ristic (Red Sift). From the blogpost:“Post-quantum signature sizes are up to 34x larger than ECDSA. Here’s why ML-DSA certificate chains blow past the 14.5 KB TCP congestion window. […] In the following table, we compare the key aspects of ML-DSA to those of traditional cryptography. We show values for the… Read more »
From the blogpost:“Every day, encryption protects the digital services we rely on. It keeps our bank transactions secure, safeguards medical records, enables confidential government communication and protects the critical infrastructure that keeps society running. […] TNO, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, works with governments, industry and research partners to translate scientific knowledge into… Read more »
From the blogpost:“[…] We’ve based our PQC migration strategy on the Google Quantum Threat Model, prioritizing protection across three key domains: The roadmap to 2029 We’ve established specific customer-centered journeys for Google Cloud to achieve quantum readiness that allow us to prioritize our quantum-safety initiatives. By adopting this risk-based approach, we focus on the core… Read more »
By the Australian Signals Directorate From the blogpost:“[…] Preparing for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) starts long before the quantum threat arrives. To help organisations take practical steps now, our LATICE framework provides a structured approach to transitioning to PQC. This article is part of an ongoing series exploring each phase of the framework:
The RFC proposed standard is now available on the IETF Datatracker (see link below). About the QSC Atlas:“ML-KEM is a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) defined in [NIST-FIPS-203]. It is designed to withstand cryptanalytic attacks from quantum computers. [RFC9954] defines a framework for combining traditional key exchanges with next-generation key exchange in TLS 1.3. The goal… Read more »
This atlas is now available online. About the QSC Atlas:“An independent, evidence-based reference on how governments are migrating to quantum-safe cryptography, built only from official institutional sources and maintained alongside advisory work on the transition. The Atlas is maintained within the Cybersecurity@CEPS Initiative at the Centre for European Policy Studies. How it classifies countries, and… Read more »
As announced in a recent research paper/chapter from the conference proceedings of MAgiCS (Migration and Agility in Cryptographic Systems) 2026. From the paper’s abstract:“Quantum-safe alternatives are expected to replace most of the asymmetric cryptography algorithms currently in use in the near future. The migration of numerous systems and infrastructures to PQC is guided by the… Read more »
The parties signed a ground lease agreement allowing installation of the optical ground station (OGS) at the NL Space Campus. From the announcement:“SES, a space solutions company, jointly with Airbus Netherlands B.V. signed a ground lease agreement with the Dutch municipality of Noordwijk for a plot at the NL Space Campus, next to the European… Read more »
Bas Westerbaan shows whether the connection was protected with post-quantum encryption. A short announcement of the latest update via LinkedIn, by Bas Westerbaan himself: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/baswesterbaan_i-updated-pqspy-a-little-firefox-extension-share-7487861733542354945-cKFy