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USA: Securing the nation against advanced cryptographic attacks

From the page on the order:“[…] The advent of large-scale quantum computers, particularly in the hands of adversaries, will pose a significant threat to widely used cryptographic security systems. Ongoing cyber activity against our Nation also presents the risk of adversaries collecting United States information now, and decrypting it later once large-scale quantum computers are… Read more »

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France to stop certifying products without quantum-safe encryption

From the Reuters webpage:“France’s cybersecurity agency ANSSI said on Tuesday it would stop certifying security products that lack quantum-resistant encryption, a move that will ​force government bodies and critical operators to shift away from older ‌systems. Samih Souissi, ANSSI’s chief of staff, said at the France Quantum conference that the agency would halt such certifications… Read more »

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Post-quantum Group-based Cryptography in the AI Era in Europe

By the European Mathematical Society (EMS), Topical Activity Group (TAG) From the group’s page:“Our EMS Tropical Activity Group aims to promote European collaboration in the field of Post-Quantum Group-Based Cryptography. In particular, our team focuses on the mathematical foundations of post-quantum cryptography, aiming to develop cryptographic systems secure against quantum attacks while fostering collaboration between… Read more »

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HAPKIDO Handbook: Navigating the Transition to Quantum-Safe PKI

From the HAPKIDO webpage:“The HAPKIDO handbook guides organisations, policymakers, and PKI operators in navigating the transition to quantum‑safe PKIs by raising awareness of quantum threats and providing actionable insights for migration. Although the transition remains complex and constrained by ongoing standardisation and dependencies, the handbook emphasises that organisations can already take “no‑regrets” steps—such as conducting… Read more »

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PQC Readiness Report

By Luxembourgish NC3 & LuxQuantum From the webpage: “The 2026 PQC Readiness Survey Report, conducted by NC3 in partnership with LuxQuantum, assesses Luxembourg’s Post-Quantum Cryptography maturity across more than 25 organisations spanning IT leadership, CISOs, CIOs, and executives. The findings reveal an ecosystem broadly aware of the quantum threat yet slow to translate that awareness… Read more »

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Building Luxembourg’s quantum-safe future

By the Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust: From the news page: “Quantum technologies are set to transform cybersecurity. Malicious actors are already harvesting today’s secure data now to later decrypt with quantum computers. Current encryption methods protect everything from sensitive communications and financial transactions to healthcare data and government systems. This means action… Read more »

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Recordings – PQCSA workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptographic Protocols

Recordings with additional information on the event from May “The looming threat of quantum computers to the security of our current digital infrastructure mandates a swift, informed transition to post-quantum cryptographic primitives and protocols. The transition to PQC is a complex process involving diverse stakeholder interests and perspectives, ranging from academic researchers to industry leaders… Read more »

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Where to Go Next with Quantum-Safe Certificates

From the blogpost: “In reaction to ongoing advances in quantum computing, we recently updated our quantum threat model and established 2029 as the target date for Google’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) migration. Accelerating the timeline means we must hasten the development and deployment of quantum-safe digital signatures, particularly for public-key certificates. While deployment of quantum-resistant key… Read more »

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ECCG Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms: Version 3 – draft for public review

From the webpage:“These guidelines supporting the EUCC scheme (the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme on Common Criteria) provides recommendations regarding the cryptographic mechanisms that should preferably be used in ICT products submitted to certification. This document is primarily addressed to developers and evaluators. The ECCG subgroup on cryptography, that is responsible for the maintenance of ACM,… Read more »

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Exploiting ML-DSA bugs

From the paper: “At least four Dilithium software vulnerabilities have been announced so far, including an identical vulnerability in each of the two official Dilithium 1.0 implementations and two different vulnerabilities in a “verified” implementation of Dilithium 3.4, also known as ML-DSA. However, there do not appear to have been any demos showing exploitability of… Read more »